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1. Introduction 
As computer networks continue to grow, it becomes increasingly more important to 
automate the process of evaluating their vulnerability to attacks. Despite the best efforts of 
software architects and developers, network hosts inevitably contain a number of 
vulnerabilities. Hence, it is not feasible for a network administrator to remove all 
vulnerabilities present in the network hosts. Therefore, the recent focus in security of such 
networks is on analysis of vulnerabilities globally, finding exploits that are more critical, and 
preventing them to thwart an intruder. 
When evaluating the security of a network, it is rarely enough to consider the presence or 
absence of isolated vulnerabilities. This is because intruders often combine exploits against 
multiple vulnerabilities in order to reach their goals (Abadi & Jalili, 2005). For example, an 
intruder might exploit the vulnerability of a particular version of FTP to overwrite the 
.rhosts file on a victim host. In the next step, the intruder could remotely log in to the victim. 
In a subsequent step, the intruder could use the victim host as a base to launch another 
exploit on a new victim, and so on. 
(Phillips & Swiler, 1998) proposed the concept of attack graphs, where each node represents 
a possible attack state. Edges represent a change of state caused by a single action taken by 
the intruder. (Sheyner et al., 2002) used a modified version of the model checker NuSMV 
(NuSMV, 2010) to produce attack graphs. (Ammann et al., 2002) introduced a monotonicity 
assumption and used it to develop a polynomial algorithm to encode all of the edges in an 
attack graph without actually computing the graph itself. These attack graphs are essentially 
similar to (Phillips & Swiler, 1998), where any path in the graph from an initial node to a 
goal node shows a sequence of exploits that an intruder can launch to reach his goal. 
(Noel et al., 2005) presented a number of techniques for managing attack graph complexity 
through visualization. (Mehta et al., 2006) presented a ranking scheme for the nodes of an 
attack graph. Rank of a node shows its importance based on factors like the probability of an 
intruder reaching that node. Given a ranked attack graph, the system administrator can 
concentrate on relevant subgraphs to figure out how to start deploying security measures. 
(Ou et al., 2006) presented logical attack graphs, which directly illustrate logical dependencies 
among attack goals and configuration information. Their attack graph generation tool builds 
upon MulVAL (Ou et al., 2005), a network security analyzer based on logical programming. 
The aim of minimization analysis of network attack graphs is to find a minimum critical set 
of exploits that completely disconnect the initial nodes and the goal nodes of the graph. 
www.intechopen.com
Evolutionary Algorithms 
 
86 
(Sheyner et al., 2002) and (Jha et al., 2002) showed this problem is in fact NP-hard. They 
proposed an approximation algorithm, ApproxNAG, that can find an approximately-
optimal set of exploits, which must be prevented to thwart an intruder. (Abadi & Jalili, 2006) 
and (Abadi & Jalili, 2008) presented an ant colony optimization algorithm, AntNAG, and a 
genetic algorithm, GenNAG, for minimization analysis of network attack graphs. 
While it is currently possible to generate very large and complex network attack graphs, 
relatively little work has been done for analysis of them. 
Particle swarm optimization (PSO) (Kennedy & Eberhart, 1995) is a population based 
stochastic optimization algorithm that was inspired by social behaviour of flocks of birds 
when they are searching for food. 
It has been shown in many empirical studies that global optimization algorithms lack 
exploitation abilities in later stages of the optimization process. This is also true for the basic 
PSO as shown in (Shi & Eberhart, 1999); (Hendtlass & Randall, 2001); (Braendler & 
Hendtlass, 2002), however, it provides mechanisms to balance exploration and exploitation 
through proper settings of the inertia weight, acceleration coefficients and velocity 
clamping. Many variations of the basic PSO have been proposed to address this problem 
(Engelbrecht, 2005). Most of them first allow the algorithm to explore new regions, and 
when a good region is located, allow the algorithm to exploit the search space to refine 
solutions. This is a sequential approach to balancing exploration and exploitation 
(Engelbrecht, 2005). 
Another approach is to embed a local optimizer in between the iterations of the global 
search heuristics. By doing this, exploration and exploitation occur in parallel (Engelbrecht, 
2005). Such hybrids of local and global search heuristics have been studied elaborately in the 
evolutionary computation paradigm (Eiben & Smith, 2003), and are generally referred to as 
memetic algorithms (Krasnogor et al., 2006). While evolutionary algorithms take inspiration 
from biological evolution, memetic algorithms mimic cultural evolution. The term meme 
refers to a unit of cultural information that can be transmitted from one mind to another 
after reinterpretation and improvement that in the context of combinatorial optimization 
corresponds to local search. 
In this paper, we present a memetic PSO algorithm, called ParticleNAG, for minimization 
analysis of large-scale network attack graphs (NAGs). We also compare the performance of 
ParticleNAG with ApproxNAG (Sheyner et al., 2002); (Jha et al., 2002), AntNAG (Abadi & 
Jalili, 2006), and GenNAG (Abadi & Jalili, 2008) for minimization analysis of several large-
scale network attack graphs. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of PSO, 
Section 3 introduces our network security model, and Section 4 describes the process of 
minimization analysis of network attack graphs. Section 5 presents ParticleNAG. Section 6 
reports the experimental results and finally Section 7 draws some conclusions. 
2. Particle swarm optimization 
Particle swarm optimization (PSO) is a population based stochastic optimization. It was 
inspired by social behaviour of flocks of birds when they are searching for food. In PSO, the 
potential solutions, called particles, fly through the problem space exploring for better regions. 
The position of a particle is influenced by the best position visited by itself and the position of 
the best particle in its neighbourhood. When the neighbourhood of a particle is the entire 
swarm, the best position in the neighbourhood is referred to as the global best particle, and the 
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resulting algorithm is referred to as a gbest PSO. When smaller neighbourhoods are used, the 
algorithm is generally referred to as a lbest PSO (Kennedy et al., 2001). 
The performance of each particle is measured using a predefined fitness function, which is 
related to the problem to be solved. Each particle in the swarm has a current position, ix , a 
velocity (rate of position change), iv , and a personal best position, iy . The personal best 
position of particle i shows the best fitness reached by that particle at a given time. Let f be 
the objective function to be maximized. Then the personal best position of a particle at 
iteration or time step t is updated as 
 
( 1) if ( ( )) ( ( 1))
( )
( ) if ( ( )) ( ( 1))
i i i
i
i i i
y t f x t f y t
y t
x t f x t f y t
− ≤ −⎧= ⎨ > −⎩
 (1) 
For the gbest model, the best particle is determined from the entire swarm by selecting the 
best personal best position. This position is denoted as ŷ. The equation that manipulates the 
velocity is called the velocity update equation and is stated as 
 
1 1
2 2
( 1) ( ) ( )( ( ) ( ))
ˆ( )( ( ) ( ))
ij ij j ij ij
j j ij
v t v t c r t y t x t
c r t y t x t
+ = + − +
−  (2) 
where ( 1)ijv t +  is the velocity updated for the jth dimension, j = 1, 2, …, d. 1c  and 2c  are 
the acceleration constants, where the first moderates the maximum step size towards the 
best personal of the particle, while the second moderates the maximum step size towards 
the global best particle in just one iteration. 1 ( )jr t  and 2 ( )jr t  are two random values in the 
range [0,1] and give the PSO algorithm a stochastic search property. 
Velocity updates on each dimension can be clamped with a user defined maximum velocity 
Vmax, which would prevent them from exploding, thereby causing premature convergence 
(Eberhart et al., 1996); (Shi, 2004). Each particle updates its position using the following 
equation: 
 ( 1) ( ) ( 1)i i ix t x t v t+ = + +  (3) 
In swarm terminology, particle i is flying to its new position ( 1)ix t + . After the new position 
is calculated for each particle, the iteration counter increases and the new particle positions 
are evaluated. This process is repeated until some convergence criteria is satisfied. 
(Kennedy & Eberhart, 1997) have adapted PSO to search in binary spaces. For binary PSO, 
the elements of ix , iy  and ŷ can only take the values 0 and 1. The velocity iv  is interpreted 
as a probability to change a bit from 0 to 1, or from 1 to 0 when updating the position of 
particles. Therefore, the velocity vector remains continuous-valued. Since each ijv  is a real 
value, a mapping needs to be defined from ijv  to a probability in the range [0,1]. This is 
done by using a sigmoid function to squash velocities into a [0,1] range. The sigmoid 
function is defined as 
 
1
( )
1 v
sig v
e−
= +  (4) 
The equation for updating positions is then replaced by the following probabilistic update 
equation: 
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0 if ( ) ( ( 1))
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 (5) 
where 3 ( )jr t  is a random value in the range [0,1]. 
In binary PSO, the meaning and behaviour of velocity clamping differ substantially from 
real-valued PSO. With the velocity interpreted as a probability of change, velocity clamping, 
Vmax, sets the minimal probability for a bit to change its value from 0 to 1, or from 1 to 0 
(Engelbrecht, 2005). 
In this paper, we use the gbest model of binary PSO for minimization analysis of network 
attack graphs. 
3. Network security model 
Our network security model is a tuple (S, H, C, T, E, M, R), where S is a set of services, H is a 
set of hosts connected to the network, C is a relation expressing connectivity between hosts, 
T is a relation expressing trust between hosts, E is a set of individual known exploits that 
intruder can use to construct attack scenarios, M is a set of countermeasures that must be 
implemented to prevent exploits, and R is a model of intruder. 
Services 
Each service s S∈  is a pair ( , )svn p , where svn  is the service name and p  is the port on 
which the service is listening. 
Hosts  
Each host h H∈  is a tuple ( , , , )id svcs plvl vuls , where id  is a unique host identifier, svcs  is a 
set of services running on the host, plvl  is the level of privilege that the intruder has on the 
host, and vuls  is a set of host-specific vulnerable components. For simplicity, we only 
consider three privilege levels: none, user, and root. 
Network Connectivity 
Network connectivity is modelled as a relation C H H P⊆ × × , where P  is a set of port 
numbers. Each network connectivity c C∈  is a triple ( sh , th , p ), where sh  is the source 
host, th  is the target host, and p  is the target port number. Note that the connectivity 
relation incorporates network elements such as firewalls that restrict the ability of one host 
to connect to another. 
Trust Relationships 
Trust relationships are modelled as a relation T H H⊆ × , where ( , )t sT h h  indicates that a 
user may log in from host sh  to host th  without authentication. 
Exploits 
Each exploit e E∈  is a tuple ( pre , sh , th , post ), where pre  is a list of conditions that must 
hold before launching the exploit, sh  is the host from which the exploit is launched, th  is 
the host targeted by the exploit, and post  specifies the effects of exploit on the network. An 
exploit e E∈  is inevitable if its prevention is not feasible or incurs high cost. The set of 
inevitable exploits is denoted by I . 
www.intechopen.com
A Memetic Particle Swarm Optimization Algorithm for Network Vulnerability Analysis 
 
89 
Countermeasures 
To prevent an exploit e E∈ , the security analyst must implement a suitable countermeasure 
m M∈ , such as 
• changing the firewall configuration 
• patching the vulnerability that made this exploit possible 
• deploying a host-based or network-based intrusion detection and prevention system 
• modifying the configuration of network services and applications 
• deleting user accounts 
• changing access rights 
• setting up a virtual private network (VPN) 
Intruder 
The intruder has some knowledge about the target network, such as known vulnerabilities, 
user passwords, and information gathered with port scans. The intruder's knowledge is 
modelled as a relation R ID PW VUL INF⊆ × × × , where ID  is a set of host identifiers, PW  
is a set of user passwords, VUL  is a set of known vulnerabilities, and INF  is a set of 
information gathered through port scans and operating system identification techniques. 
4. Minimization analysis of network attack graphs 
Let { }1 2, ,..., nE e e e=  be the set of exploits, I E⊆  be the set of inevitable exploits, { }1 2, ,..., pM m m m=  be the set of countermeasures, and \: 2E Iprv M →  be a function. An 
exploit ( )j ie prv m∈  if and only if implementing the countermeasure im  prevents the 
exploit je . 
A network attack graph is a tuple 0( , , , , )fG V A V V L= , where V  is the set of nodes, A  is the 
set of directed edges, 0V V⊆  is the set of initial nodes, fV V⊆  is the set of goal nodes, and 
:L A E→  is a labelling function, where ( ) jL a e=  if and only if an edge ( , )a v v′=  
corresponds to an exploit je E∈ . A path π  in G  is a sequence of nodes 1 2, ,..., mv v v , such 
that iv V∈  and 1( , )i iv v A+ ∈ , where 1 i m≤ < . The label of path π  is a subset of the set of 
exploits E . Each attack scenario corresponds to a complete path that starts from an initial 
node and ends in a goal node. 
Let { }1 2, , ..., lS S S S=  be the set of attack scenarios represented by the network attack graph 
G . The attack scenario kS S∈  is hit by the exploit je E∈  if j ke S∈ . 
Definition 1. Total Hit Value 
For each exploit je E∈ , the total hit value ( )t jhv e  is defined to be the number of attack scenarios that 
are hit by je . 
 { }( ) |t j k j khv e S S e S= ∈ ∈  (6) 
Definition 2. Redundant Exploit 
Let U E⊆  be a subset of exploits and ( )hs U  be the set of attack scenarios hit by the exploits in U . 
 { }( ) | for somek j k jhs U S S e S e U= ∈ ∈ ∈  (7) 
An exploit je  is redundant with respect to U if ( \{ }) ( )jhs U e hs U= . 
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Definition 3. Partial Hit Value 
Let U E⊆  be a subset of exploits. For each exploit je U∉ , the partial hit value ( , )p jhv e U  is defined 
to be the number of attack scenarios that are hit by je , but that are not hit by any exploit in U . 
 { }( , ) | ( )p j k j k khv e U S S e S S hs U= ∈ ∈ ∧ ∉  (8) 
Definition 4. Exclusive Hit Value 
Let U E⊆  be a subset of exploits. For each exploit je U∈ , the exclusive hit value ( , )x jhv e U  is 
defined to be the number of attack scenarios that are hit by je , but that are not hit by any exploit in 
\{ }jU e . 
Definition 5. Critical Set of Exploits 
A subset of exploits \CE E I⊆  is critical if and only if all attack scenarios are hit by the exploits in 
it. Equivalently, CE  is critical if and only if every complete path from an initial node to a goal node 
of the network attack graph G has at least one edge labelled with an exploit je CE∈ . 
Definition 6. Minimal Critical Set of Exploits 
A critical set of exploits CE  is minimal if it contains no redundant exploit. 
Definition 7. Minimum Critical Set of Exploits 
A critical set of exploits CE  is minimum if there is no critical set of exploits CE′  such that 
CE CE′ < . 
Definition 8. Critical Set of Countermeasures 
A subset of countermeasures CM M⊆  is critical if and only if all attack scenarios are prevented by 
implementing the countermeasures in it. Equivalently, CM  is critical if and only if every complete 
path from an initial node to a goal node of the network attack graph G has at least one edge labelled 
with an exploit ( )je es CM∈ , where ( )es CM  is the set of exploits prevented by implementing the 
countermeasures in CM . 
 ( ) ( )
i
im CM
es CM prv m∈=∪  (9) 
Definition 9. Minimal Critical Set of Countermeasures 
A critical set of countermeasures CM  is minimal if it contains no redundant countermeasure. 
Definition 10. Minimum Critical Set of Countermeasures 
A critical set of countermeasures CM  is minimum if there is no critical set of countermeasures CM′  
such that CM CM′ < . 
In general, there can be multiple minimum critical set of exploits/countermeasures. We can 
now state formally two problems: MCEP and MCCP (Sheyner et al., 2002); (Jha et al., 2002). 
Definition 11. Minimum Critical Set of Exploits Problem (MCEP)  
Given a network attack graph G  and a set of exploits E , find a minimum critical subset of exploits 
\CE E I⊆  for G . 
Definition 12. Minimum Critical Set of Countermeasures Problem (MCCP)  
Given a network attack graph G , a set of exploits E , and a set of countermeasures M , find a 
minimum critical subset of countermeasures CM M⊆  for G . 
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There is a trivial reduction from MCEP to MCCP, and vice versa. Given an instance ( , )G E  of 
MCEP, we can construct an instance ( , , )G E M  of MCCP where { }{ }|j jM e e E= ∈ . 
A typical process for solving MCEP or MCCP is shown in Fig. 1. First, vulnerability 
scanning tools, such as Nessus (Deraison, 2010), determine vulnerabilities of individual 
hosts. Using this vulnerability information along with exploit templates, intruder’s goals, 
and other information about the network, such as connectivity between hosts, a network 
attack graph is generated. In this directed graph, each complete path from an initial node to 
a goal node corresponds to an attack scenario. The minimization analysis of the network 
attack graph determines a minimum critical set of exploits/countermeasures that must be 
prevented/implemented to guarantee no attack scenario is possible. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Minimization analysis of network attack graphs 
4. ParticleNAG 
In this section, we present ParticleNAG, a memetic particle swarm optimization algorithm 
for minimization analysis of large-scale network attack graphs. The aim of minimization 
analysis of network attack graphs is to find a minimum critical set of exploits/ 
countermeasures. This problem is in fact a constrained optimization problem in which the 
objective is to find a solution with minimum cardinality and the constraint is that the 
solution must be critical (i.e., it must hit all attack scenarios). 
Fig. 2 shows the pseudo-code of ParticleNAG. The first step is to initialize the swarm and 
control parameters. Then repeated iterations of the algorithm are executed until some 
termination condition is met (e.g., a maximum number of iterations is reached). Within each 
iteration, if each particle’s current position xi does not represent a critical set of exploits, a 
greedy repair algorithm is applied to it. Then redundant exploits of xi are eliminated. After 
that, xi is improved by a local search heuristic procedure. Then the particle’s personal best 
position yi is updated using equation (1). The global best position ŷ is then determined from 
the entire swarm by selecting the best personal best position. Finally, the velocity and the 
position of each particle are updated using equations (2) and (5). 
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procedure ParticleNAG 
     Set parameters, create and initialize the swarm 
     while termination condition not met do 
          for each particle i do 
               if ix does not represent a critical set of exploits then 
                    Apply the greedy repair procedure to ix ; 
               end if 
               Eliminate redundant exploits of ix ; 
               Apply the local search heuristic to ix ; 
               Update the personal best position iy ; 
          end for 
          Update the global best position yˆ ; 
          for each particle i do 
               Update the velocity iv ; 
               Update the position ix ; 
          end for 
     end while 
end ParticleNAG 
Fig. 2. The ParticleNAG algorithm 
5.1 Problem representation 
Let { }1 2, , ..., nE e e e=  be the set of preventable exploits. Each particle position ix  
corresponds to an n-bit vector 1 2( , , ..., )i i inx x x  and represents a subset of exploits iE E⊆  in 
which the exploit j ie E∈  if and only if the element 1ijx = . 
 { }| 1i j ijE e E x= ∈ =  (10) 
Let { }1 2, , ..., lS S S S=  be the set of attack scenarios represented by the network attack graph 
G. The attack scenario kS S∈  is hit by the particle position ix  if k iS E ≠ ∅∩ . 
The particle position ix  represents a critical set of exploits if all attack scenarios are hit by it. 
The aim of minimization analysis of network attack graphs is to find a minimum critical  
set of exploits. So ParticleNAG uses the following fitness function to evaluate the quality of 
ix : 
 ( ) | | | |i if x E E= −  (11) 
5.2 Greedy repair 
The set of exploits represented by a particle position xi may not be critical. In other words, it 
may not hit all attack scenarios. 
Let iE  be the set of exploits represented by a particle position ix . As shown in Fig. 3, the 
greedy repair algorithm chooses at each step an exploit ke E∈  such that k ie E∉  and it 
maximizes the partial hit value ( , )p k ihv e E . It then adds ke  to iE  and changes its 
corresponding element ikx  to 1. This is repeated until a critical set of exploits is obtained. 
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procedure GreedyRepair ( ix ) 
     { }1| =∈= ijji xEeE ; 
     while ix  does not represent a critical set of exploits do 
          Choose an exploit Eek ∈  such that ik Ee ∉  and it maximizes  
          the partial hit value ),( ikp Eehv ; 
         }{ kii eEE ∪= ; 
         1=ikx ; 
         maxVvik = ; 
     end while 
     return ix ; 
end GreedyRepair 
Fig. 3. The greedy repair procedure 
5.3 Greedy elimination 
The critical set of exploits represented by a particle position ix  may contain redundant 
exploits, which must be eliminated. Let iE  be the critical set of exploits represented by ix . 
The exploit je  is called candidate redundant with respect to iE  if ( , ) 0x j ihv e E = . The set of 
candidate redundant exploits of iE  is denoted by iR . 
 { }| ( , ) 0i j i x j iR e E hv e E= ∈ =  (12) 
For each candidate redundant exploit j ie R∈ , the selection value ( , )j isv e E  is calculated as 
 
\{ }
( , ) ( , \{ })
k i j
j i x k i j
e E e
sv e E hv e E e
∈
= ∑  (13) 
The selection value is used to evaluate candidate redundant exploits of a critical set of 
exploits in order to choose a candidate redundant exploit to be removed from it. 
 
procedure GreedyElimination ( ix ) 
     { }| 1i j ijE e E x= ∈ = ; 
     { }| ( , ) 0i j i x j iR e E hv e E= ∈ = ; 
     while iR ≠ ∅  do 
          Choose an exploit k ie R∈  that maximizes the selection 
          value ( , )k isv e E ; 
         \{ }i i kE E e= ; 
         0ikx = ; 
         maxikv V= − ; 
         { }| ( , ) 0i j i x j iR e E hv e E= ∈ = ; 
     end while 
     return ix ; 
end GreedyElimination 
Fig. 4. The greedy elimination procedure 
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In Fig. 4 an algorithm is presented, which can be used to eliminate redundant exploits of ix . 
Let iE  be the critical set of exploits represented by ix . The algorithm is based on the idea 
that it is good to remove an exploit ke  from iE  if ke  is a candidate redundant exploit and 
hits attack scenarios that are hit by too many other exploits in iE . Hence, at each step, the 
algorithm chooses a candidate redundant exploit ke  from iR  that maximizes the selection 
value ( , )k isv e E . It then removes ke  from iE  and changes its corresponding element ikx  to 0. 
This is repeated until a minimal critical set of exploits is obtained. 
5.4 Local search heuristic 
Combining global and local search is a strategy used by many successful global 
optimization approaches.  
In ParticleNAG, a local search heuristic is applied to the current position of each particle to 
improve them before their personal best positions are updated. The local search heuristic is 
based on the following idea: given a particle position ix  and its corresponding critical set of 
exploits iE , suppose there is an exploit je E∈  such that j ie E∉  and { }i jE e∪  contains at 
least two exploits other than je , say 1 ,..., re e′ ′ , with 2r ≥  that are redundant. Then we 
conclude that 1( \{ ,..., }) { }i r jE e e e′ ′ ∪  is a better critical set of exploits than iE . The gain of  
the exploit je  with respect to iE  is ( , ) 1j ig e E l= − . In this case, we call je  a candidate 
dominant exploit.  
 
 
procedure LocalSearch( ix ) 
     { }| 1i j ijE e E x= ∈ = ; 
     while improvement is possible do 
          Choose an exploit ke E∈ such that k ie E∉  and ( , ) 0k ig e E > ; 
         { }i i kE E e= ∪ ; 
         1ikx = ; 
         maxikv V= ; 
          Eliminate redundant exploits of ix ; 
     end while 
     return ix ; 
end LocalSearch 
Fig. 5. The local search heuristic procedure 
As shown in Fig. 5, the local search heuristic first chooses a candidate dominant exploit ke  
and changes its corresponding element ikx  to 1. It then eliminates the redundant exploits of 
the new position using the algorithm already presented in Section 5.3 for eliminating 
redundant exploits. This process is repeated until no further improvement is possible. 
6. Experiments 
In order to evaluate the performance of ParticleNAG, we performed our experiments over a 
sample network attack graph and several randomly generated large-scale network attack 
graphs. 
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6.1 Sample network attack graph 
Consider the network shown in Fig. 6. There are three target hosts called RedHat, Windows 
and Fedora on an internal network, and a host called PublicServer on an isolated 
demilitarized zone (DMZ) network. One firewall separates the internal network from the 
DMZ and another firewall separates the DMZ from the rest of the Internet. A number of 
services are running on each of the hosts of RedHat, Windows, Fedora, and PublicServer. Also, 
each of the above hosts has a number of vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scanning tools such as 
Nessus (Deraison, 2010) can be used to find the vulnerabilities of each host. 
 
 
Fig. 6. An example network 
Different types of services and vulnerabilities available on the network hosts are introduced 
in Table 1. 
 
iis_bof(h) IIS web server has buffer overflow vulnerability on host h  
exchange_ivv(h) Exchange mail server has input validation vulnerability on host h  
squid_conf(h) Squid web proxy is misconfigured on host h  
licq_ivv(h) LICQ client has input validation vulnerability on host h  
sshd_bof(h) SSH server has buffer overflow vulnerability on host h  
scripting(h) HTML scripting is enabled on host h  
ftp(h) FTP service is running on host h  
wdir(h) FTP home directory is writable on host h  
fshell(h) FTP user has executable shell on  host h  
xterm_bof(h) xterm program has buffer overflow vulnerability on host h  
at_bof(h) at program has buffer overflow vulnerability on host h  
database(h) database service is running on  host h  
Table 1. Types of services and vulnerabilities running on the network hosts 
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The RedHat host on the internal network is running FTP and SSH services. The Fedora host is 
running several services: LICQ chat software, Squid web proxy, FTP and a database. The 
LICQ client lets Linux users exchange text messages over the Internet. The Squid web proxy 
is a full-featured web proxy cache. Web browsers can then use the local Squid cache as a 
proxy server, reducing access time as well as bandwidth consumption. The PublicServer host 
on the DMZ network is running IIS and Exchange services. 
The connectivity information among the network hosts is shown in Table 2. In this Table, 
each entry corresponds to a pair of (hs, ht) in which hs is the source host and ht is the target 
host. Every entry has five boolean values. These values are ‘T’ if host hs can connect to host 
ht on the ports of http, licq, ftp, ssh, and smtp, respectively. 
 
Host Intruder PublicServer RedHat Windows Fedora 
Intruder F,F,F,F,F T,F,F,F,T F,F,F,F,F F,F,F,F,F F,F,F,F,F 
PublicServer F,F,F,F,F T,F,F,F,T F,F,T,T,F F,F,F,F,F T,T,T,F,F 
RedHat F,F,F,F,F T,F,F,F,T F,F,T,T,F F,F,F,F,F T,T,T,F,F 
Windows F,F,F,F,F T,F,F,F,T F,F,T,T,F F,F,F,F,F T,T,T,F,F 
Fedora F,F,F,F,F T,F,F,F,T F,F,T,T,F F,F,F,F,F T,T,T,F,F 
Table 2. Network connectivity information 
The intruder launches his attack starting from a single host, Intruder, which lies on the 
outside network. His goal is to disrupt the database service on the host Fedora. To achieve 
this goal, the intruder should gain the root privilege on this host.  
There are wdir, fshell, and sshd_bof vulnerabilities on the RedHat host, scripting vulnerability 
on the Windows host, wdir, fshell, squid_conf, and licq_ivv vulnerabilities on the Fedora host, 
and iis_bof and exchange_ivv on the PublicServer host. Also, at and xterm programs on the 
RedHat and Fedora are vulnerable to buffer overflow. The intruder can use ten generic 
exploits, described as follows: 
• iis_r2r 
Buffer overflow vulnerability in the Microsoft IIS web server allows remote intruders to 
gain root shell on the target host. 
• exchange_r2u 
The OLE component in the Microsoft Exchange mail server does not properly validate 
the lengths of messages for certain OLE data, which allows remote intruders to execute 
arbitrary code. 
• squid_ps 
The intruder can use a misconfigured Squid web proxy to conduct unauthorized 
activities such as port scanning. 
• licq_r2u 
The intruder can send a specially crafted URL to the LICQ client to execute arbitrary 
commands on the target host. 
• script_r2u 
Microsoft Internet Explorer allows remote intruders to execute arbitrary code via 
malformed Content-Disposition and Content-Type header fields that cause the 
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application for the spoofed file type to pass the file back to the operating system for 
handling rather than raise an error message. 
• ssh_r2r 
Buffer overflow vulnerability in the SSH server allows remote intruders to gain root 
shell on the target host. 
• ftp_rhosts 
Using FTP vulnerability, the intruder creates a .rhosts file in the FTP home directory, 
creating a remote login trust relationship between his host and the target host. 
• rsh_r2u 
Using an existing remote login trust relationship between two hosts, the intruder logs in 
from one machine to another, getting a user shell without supplying a password. 
• xterm_u2r 
Buffer overflow vulnerability in the xterm program allows local users to gain root shell 
on the target host. 
• at_u2r 
Buffer overflow vulnerability in the at program allows local users to gain root shell on 
the target host. 
In Table 3, each generic exploit is represented by its preconditions and postconditions. More 
information about each of the exploits is available in (NVD, 2010). Before an exploit can be 
used, its preconditions must be met. Each exploit will increase the network vulnerability if it 
is successful. Among the ten generic exploits shown in Table 3, the first eight generic 
exploits require a pair of hosts and the last two generic exploits require only one host. 
Therefore, there are 8 * 5 * 4 + 2 * 4 = 168 exploits in total, which the intruder can try. Each 
attack scenario for the above network consists of a subset of these 168 exploits. For example, 
consider the following attack scenario: 
1. iis_r2r(Intruder, PublicServer)  
2. squid_ps(PublicServer, Fedora)  
3. licq_r2u(PublicServer, Fedora)  
4. xterm_u2r(Fedora, Fedora)  
The intruder first launches the iis_r2r exploit to gain root privilege on the PublicServer  
host. Then he uses the PublicServer host to launch a port scan via the vulnerable Squid web 
proxy running on the Fedora host. The scan discovers that it is possible to gain user privilege 
on the Fedora host with launching the licq_r2u exploit. After that, a simple local buffer 
overflow gives the intruder root privilege on the Fedora host. The attack graph for the above 
network consists of 164 attack scenarios. Each attack scenario consists of between 4 to 9 
exploits. 
Experimental Results 
We applied ParticleNAG for minimization analysis of the above network attack graph. To 
evaluate the performance of the algorithm, we performed several experiments. 
In the first experiment, we assumed that all exploits are preventable. Therefore, the aim was 
to find a minimum critical set of exploits among 168 exploits. Using ParticleNAG, the 
following minimum critical set of exploits was found: 
CE = { iis_r2r(Intruder, PublicServer), 
exchange_r2u(Intruder, PublicServer) } 
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Exploit Preconditions Postconditions 
iis_r2r(hs, ht) 
iis_bof(ht) 
C(hs, ht, http) 
plvl(hs) ≥ user 
plvl(ht) < root 
¬iis(ht) 
plvl(ht) := root 
exchange_r2u(hs, ht) 
exchange_ivv(ht) 
C(hs, ht, smtp) 
plvl(hs) ≥ user 
plvl(ht) = none 
plvl(ht) := user 
squid_ps(hs, ht) 
squid_conf(ht) 
¬scan 
C(hs, ht, http) 
plvl(hs) ≥ user 
scan 
licq_r2u(hs, ht) 
licq_ivv(ht) 
scan 
C(hs, ht, licq) 
plvl(hs) ≥ user 
plvl(ht) = none 
plvl(ht) := user 
script_r2u(hs, ht) 
scripting(ht) 
C(ht, hs, http) 
plvl(hs) ≥ user 
plvl(ht) = none 
plvl(ht) := user 
sshd_r2r(hs, ht) 
sshd_bof(ht) 
C(hs, ht, ssh) 
plvl(hs) ≥ user 
plvl(ht) < root 
¬ssh(ht) 
plvl(ht) := root 
ftp_rhosts(hs, ht) 
ftp(ht) 
wdir(ht) 
fshell(ht) 
¬T(ht, hs) 
C(hs, ht, ftp) 
plvl(hs) ≥ user 
T(ht, hs) 
rsh_r2u(hs, ht) 
T(ht, hs) 
plvl(hs) ≥ user 
plvl(ht) = none 
plvl(ht) := user 
xterm_u2r(ht, ht) 
xterm_bof(ht) 
plvl(ht) = user 
plvl(ht) := root 
at_u2r(ht, ht) 
at_bof(ht) 
plvl(ht) = user 
plvl(ht) := root 
Table 3. Exploit templates  
In the second experiment, we assumed that the generic exploits iis_r2r, exchange_r2u, and 
xterm_u2r are inevitable, i.e., the prevention of them is not feasible or incurs high cost. 
Therefore, the aim was to find a minimum critical set of exploits among 124 exploits. Using 
ParticleNAG, the following minimum critical set of exploits was found: 
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CE = { licq_r2u(PublicServer, Fedora),  
licq_r2u(RedHat, Fedora),  
script_r2u(PublicServer, Windows),  
ftp_rhosts(PublicServer, Fedora),  
ftp_rhosts(RedHat, Fedora) } 
It should be mentioned that the exact cardinality of the minimum critical set of exploits for 
this network attack graph is 5, so the above critical set of exploits found by ParticleNAG is 
minimum. While using ApproxNAG (Sheyner et al., 2002); (Jha et al., 2002), the following 
minimum critical set of exploits was found: 
CE = { script_r2u(PublicServer, Windows),  
at_u2r(Fedora, Fedora),  
sshd_r2u(PublicServer, RedHat),  
ftp_rhosts(PublicServer, RedHat),  
squid_ps(PublicServer, Fedora),  
ftp_rhosts(PublicServer, Fedora) }  
The second experiment shows ParticleNAG can find a critical set of exploits with less 
cardinality. 
In the experiments, the parameters were set to c1 = 2, c2 = 2, and Vmax = 4, which are values 
commonly used in the binary PSO literature. The swarm size was set to m = 10 and the 
maximum number of iterations was set to tmax = 50. 
6.2 Large-scale network attack graphs 
A large computer network builds upon multiple platforms, runs different software packages 
and supports several modes of connectivity. Despite the best efforts of software architects 
and developers, each network host inevitably contains a number of vulnerabilities. 
Several factors can make network attack graphs larger so that finding a minimum critical set 
of exploits/countermeasures becomes more difficult. An obvious factor is the size of the 
network under analysis. Our society has become increasingly dependent on networked 
computers and the trend towards larger networks will continue. For example, there are 
enterprises today consisting of tens of thousands of hosts. Also, less secure networks clearly 
have larger network attack graphs. Each network host might have several exploitable 
vulnerabilities. When considered across an enterprise, especially given global internet 
connectivity, network attack graphs become potentially large (Ammann et al., 2005). 
In order to further evaluate the performance of ParticleNAG, we randomly generated 14 
large-scale network attack graphs, denoted by 1NAG , 2NAG , ..., 14NAG . For each network 
attack graph, we considered different values for the cardinalities of E  and S , where E  is 
the set of preventable exploits and S  is the set of attack scenarios represented by the 
network attack graph. 
In 1NAG , ..., 7NAG , attack scenarios consists of between 3 to 9 exploits, while in 8NAG ,  
..., 14NAG , attack scenarios consists of between 3 to 12 exploits. Table 4 shows the 
cardinality of the set of preventable exploits, the cardinality of the set of attack scenarios, 
and the average cardinality of attack scenarios for each generated large-scale network attack 
graph. 
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Network 
Attack Graph 
Cardinality of the Set 
of Exploits (|E|) 
Cardinality of the Set of 
Attack Scenarios (|S|) 
Average Cardinality of 
Attack Scenarios 
1NAG  200 2000 6.01 
2NAG  400 4000 5.99 
3NAG  400 6000 5.99 
4NAG  600 6000 6.03 
5NAG  600 8000 5.95 
6NAG  800 8000 6.01 
7NAG  1000 10000 6.05 
8NAG  200 2000 7.55 
9NAG  400 4000 7.52 
10NAG  400 6000 7.48 
11NAG  600 6000 7.53 
12NAG  600 8000 7.55 
13NAG  800 8000 7.48 
14NAG  1000 10000 7.47 
Table 4. Large-scale network attack graphs 
Experimental results 
We applied ParticleNAG for minimization analysis of the above large-scale network attack 
graphs. We performed 10 runs of the algorithm with different random seeds and reported 
the best cardinality and the average cardinality of critical sets of exploits obtained from 
these 10 runs. We also applied ApproxNAG (Sheyner et al., 2002); (Jha et al., 2002), AntNAG 
(Abadi & Jalili, 2006), and GenNAG (Abadi & Jalili, 2008) for minimization analysis of the 
above network attack graphs. As shown in Table 5, ParticleNAG outperforms all the 
algorithms referenced above and finds a critical set of exploits with less cardinality. On 
average, the cardinalities of critical sets of exploits found by ParticleNAG, AntNAG, 
GenNAG are, respectively, 10.77, 9.21, and 8.95 percent less than the cardinality of critical 
set of exploits of exploits found by ApproxNAG. Accordingly, we conclude that 
ParticleNAG is more efficient than ApproxNAG, AntNAG, and GenNAG. 
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In ParticleNAG experiments, the parameters were set to c1 = 2, c2 = 2, and Vmax = 4, which 
are values commonly used in the binary PSO literature. The swarm size was set to m = 20 
and the maximum number of iterations was set to tmax = 100. 
 
ParticleNAG AntNAG GenNAG Network 
Attack 
Graph Best Average Best Average Best Average 
ApproxNAG 
1NAG  87 87.3 88 88.6 87 88.8 98 
2NAG  175 176.5 177 178.9 176 179.0 197 
3NAG  194 196.6 197 199.6 197 200.2 221 
4NAG  264 265.9 268 270.7 264 271.3 296 
5NAG  287 288.4 291 293.7 291 293.8 317 
6NAG  351 352.8 356 360.9 358 361.3 397 
7NAG  439 442.8 448 451.7 449 453.9 503 
8NAG  80 80.8 81 82.1 81 82.0 91 
9NAG  158 159.6 159 161.9 161 162.5 182 
10NAG  178 179.4 179 181.9 180 182.8 200 
11NAG  239 240.8 242 244.7 244 245.6 267 
12NAG  257 259 262 264.4 263 265.6 293 
13NAG  322 323.6 325 329.1 327 331.2 362 
14NAG  401 404 409 413.1 410 414.9 450 
Table 5. The cardinality of critical set of exploits found by ParticleNAG, AntNAG, GenNAG, 
and ApproxNAG 
Figures 7 to 10 show the progress of the average cardinality of the global best position  
of ParticleNAG, the global best solution of AntNAG, and the best chromosome of GenNAG 
in the experiments for minimization analysis of 4NAG , 7NAG , 12NAG , and 14NAG , 
respectively. As it can be seen in these figures, ParticleNAG is able to quickly converge to a 
good solution for large-scale network attack graphs and can maintain the balance  
between the exploration and exploitation reasonably well in comparison to AntNAG and 
GenNAG. 
www.intechopen.com
Evolutionary Algorithms 
 
102 
 
 
 
262
265
268
271
274
277
280
283
286
289
292
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
A
v
e
ra
g
e
  
C
a
rd
in
a
li
ty
Iteration
ParticleNAG
AntNAG
GenNAG
 
 
Fig. 7. Comparison of the performance of ParticleNAG, AntNAG, and GenNAG for 
minimization analysis of NAG4 
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Fig. 8. Comparison of the performance of ParticleNAG, AntNAG, and GenNAG for 
minimization analysis of NAG7 
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Fig. 9. Comparison of the performance of ParticleNAG, AntNAG, and GenNAG for 
minimization analysis of NAG12 
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Fig. 10. Comparison of the performance of ParticleNAG, AntNAG, and GenNAG for 
minimization analysis of NAG14 
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6.3 Algorithm parameters 
We performed experiments to analyze the effect of different settings of parameters on the 
performance of ParticleNAG.  
The effect of using the local search heuristic on the performance of ParticleNAG was 
analyzed by comparing the results of running the algorithm with and without the local 
search heuristic. Figures 11 and 12 show the progress of the average cardinality of the global  
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Fig. 11. Comparison of the performance of ParticleNAG and ParticleNAG without the local 
search heuristic for minimization analysis of NAG7 
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Fig. 12. Comparison of the performance of ParticleNAG and ParticleNAG without the local 
search heuristic for minimization analysis of NAG10 
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best position, obtained from 10 runs of ParticleNAG and 10 runs of ParticleNAG without the 
local search heuristic in the experiments for minimization analysis of 7NAG  and 10NAG , 
respectively. 
As the figures show, ParticleNAG significantly performs better than ParticleNAG without 
the local search heuristic and finds a critical set of exploits with less cardinality. This is 
because before updating the personal best position of a particle, its current position is 
improved by the local search heuristic. Hence, the personal best position of the particle 
shows a locally optimized solution.  
To analyze the effect of the swarm size on the performance of ParticleNAG, the algorithm 
was run with the parameter settings from Section 6.2 but this time with the swarm size, m, 
set to 2, 5, 15, and 20, respectively.  
As it can be seen in Table 6, when using a very small number of particles, ParticleNAG 
shows a poor performance. This is because the fewer the number of particles, the less the  
 
SwarmNAG Network 
Attack Graph 
2m=  5m=  15m=  20m=  
1NAG  89.1 88.6 87.8 87.3 
2NAG  179.7 178.1 176.9 176.5 
3NAG  201.0 198.1 197.0 196.6 
4NAG  271.6 267.8 265.7 265.9 
5NAG  294.1 290.4 288.7 288.4 
6NAG  361.8 355.1 354.2 352.8 
7NAG  451.1 446.0 442.8 442.8 
8NAG  82.7 81.8 81.5 80.8 
9NAG  163.2 160.6 160.4 159.6 
10NAG  184.2 181.2 179.1 179.4 
11NAG  245.0 242.2 241.3 240.8 
12NAG  263.8 261.6 259.9 259.0 
13NAG  330.5 326.9 323.8 323.6 
14NAG  413.1 408.1 404.7 404.0 
Table 6. Effect of the swarm size on the performance of ParticleNAG 
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exploration ability of the algorithm, and consequently the less information about the search 
space is available to all particles. 
7. Conclusions 
Each attack scenario is a sequence of exploits launched by an intruder for a particular goal. 
To prevent an exploit, the security analyst must implement a suitable countermeasure such 
as the firewall configuration or patch the vulnerabilities that made this exploit possible. The 
collection of possible attack scenarios in a computer network can be represented by a 
directed graph, called network attack graph. In this directed graph, each path from an initial 
node to a goal node corresponds to an attack scenario.  
The aim of minimization analysis of network attack graphs is to find a minimum critical set 
of exploits/countermeasures so that by preventing/implementing them the intruder cannot 
reach his goal using any attack scenarios. This problem is in fact a constrained optimization 
problem in which the objective is to find a solution with minimum cardinality and the 
constraint is that the solution must be critical. 
Several factors can make network attack graphs larger so that finding a minimum critical set 
of exploits/countermeasures becomes more difficult. An obvious factor is the size of the 
network under analysis. Our society has become increasingly dependent on networked 
computers and the trend towards larger networks will continue. Also, less secure networks 
clearly have larger network attack graphs. Each network host might have several exploitable 
vulnerabilities. When considered across an enterprise, especially given global internet 
connectivity, network attack graphs become potentially large. 
Particle swarm optimization (PSO) is a population based stochastic optimization algorithm 
that was inspired by social behaviour of flocks of birds when they are searching for food.  
While evolutionary algorithms take inspiration from biological evolution, memetic 
algorithms mimic cultural evolution. The term meme refers to a unit of cultural information 
that can be transmitted from one mind to another after reinterpretation and improvement 
that in the context of combinatorial optimization corresponds to local search. 
In this paper, we presented a memetic particle swarm optimization algorithm, called 
ParticleNAG, for minimization analysis of network attack graphs. A greedy repair method 
was used to convert the constrained optimization problem into an unconstrained one. We 
reported the results of applying ParticleNAG for minimization analysis of 14 large-scale 
network attack graphs. We also applied an approximation algorithm, ApproxNAG (Sheyner 
et al., 2002); (Jha et al., 2002), an ant colony optimization algorithm, AntNAG (Abadi & Jalili, 
2006), and a genetic algorithm, GenNAG (Abadi & Jalili, 2008), for minimization analysis of 
the above large-scale network attack graphs.  
On average, the cardinality of critical sets of exploits found by ParticleNAG was 10.77 
percent less than the cardinality of critical sets of exploits found by ApproxNAG. Also, 
ParticleNAG performed better than AntNAG and GenNAG in terms of convergence speed 
and accuracy. 
We performed experiments to analyze the effect of swarm size and local search heuristic on 
the performance of ParticleNAG. The results of experiments showed that ParticleNAG 
significantly performs better than ParticleNAG without the local search heuristic. 
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